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By

ROGER

J.

TRAYNOR

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OP CALIFORNIA

We have come a long way from the time when courts were on
guard to keep statutes in their place, in the shadow of the stone
tablets of precedent. For a good many years now legislatures
have been erecting some formidable stone tablets of their own,
inscribed in language richly current if not always clear and crisp.
Justice Breitel recognizes not merely that the legislatures are now
dominant in the formulation of laws, but that they must be, in a
world undergoing change too rapidly to await the slow elaboration of new hand-tooled precedents or the painful deciphering
of modern meanings from the fading language of the old. In
most of their affairs when regulation seems necessary, men now
look to the next legislative session, not to the day of judgment.
In street wisdom, it is easier to legislate than to litigate. This
commonplace connotes a flexibility of legislative action frequently
synonymous with sensitivity to community needs though sometimes no more than a capitulation to special interests. A legislature can run up a law on short notice, and when it has finished
all the seams it can run up another and another. It is engaged in
mass production; it produces piecework of its own volition or on
order. The great tapestry of Holmes's princess, the seamless web
of the law, becomes ever more legendary.
Whatever our admiration for ancient arts, few of us would
turn the clock back to live out what museums preserve. The law
of contracts was once well served by delightful causeries of learned
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judges that clarified the meaning of obligation. Such causeries,
however, proved inadequate to provide an expansion and diversification of words to correspond with that of business enterprise.
Thus it fell to the legislators to spell out whole statutes such as
insurance codes and the uniform laws dealing with negotiable
instruments, sales, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, stock transfers, conditional sales, trust receipts, written obligations, fiduciaries, partnerships, and limited partnership. Such statutes can
take a birds-eye view of the total problem, instead of that of an
owl on a segment. They can encompass wide generalizations from
experience that a judge is precluded from making in his decision
on a particular case. Legislatures can break sharply with the past,
if need be, as judges ordinarily cannot. They avoid the wasteful
cost in time and money of piecemeal litigation that all too frequently culminates in a crazy quilt of rules defying intelligent
restatement or coherent application. Most of all they can take the
initiative in timely solution of urgent problems, in contrast with
the inertia incumbent upon judges until random litigation brings
a problem in incomplete form to them, often too soon or too late
for over-all solution. What passes before them on the reviewing
stand is not a well-programmed orderly parade, but fragments
from a circus on the loose, collared by anxious barkers for a motley
procession across the line of vision that defies the viewing judges
to guess at all that has escaped notice and to foresee what may
still appear. Understandably, they are wont to shirk the difficulties
of working out program notes for the future from such a scene.
Their professional training, moreover, fosters reactions to present
impressions that hark back to the past; they search for resemblance
between what goes on and what has gone before. And because
the usual judge is no less lethargic than other human beings, he
is predisposed to accept a specious analogy and to freeze it into
the law. It is not thereafter easily defrosted, as some of us well
know who have had to deal with icebergs that have developed
beyond reasonable proportions.
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There is now general agreement that we have moved out of
the Ice Age. It is no longer enough for lawyers to have a respectable training in precedents and a respectful preoccupation with
the past. There are no adequate precedents for much of the law
that must be formulated today to regulate multiminded, multihanded human beings. The main preoccupation of such law must
be with the future. Its main formulation belongs appropriately
to legislators, who are freer than judges to write on a clean slate,
in terms of policy transcending case or controversy, and to erase
and rewrite in response to community needs.
Some fear that the proliferation of statutes and administrative
regulations will subject the judge to an impossible burden of
review. Others fear instead that it will lead to his rapid technological depreciation. A judge unaccustomed to public sympathy
must nonetheless be disconcerted if he receives it for the wrong
reasons. He knows these two concerns on his behalf to be mistaken as well as contradictory. As he plods his way from one controversy to another, he is inured to overemployment. He fears no
unemployment, for he knows that plus ga change, plus c'est la
meme chose in action. Television has not superseded radio, nor
radio the phonograph, nor any of them the live musicians. Instead all have flourished and the miracles of technical reproduction have but quickened our awareness of how inimitable is the
live performance. The endless statutes and regulations should in
time, by the very impersonality of their numbers that yet reflects
the involvement of their drafters, engender a new appreciation of
the irreplaceable humanity in the individual judicial opinion that
yet reflects the detachment of its author.
When Warner Gardner finds it impossible to make a still-life
definition of the administrative process he knows so w~ell, he nonetheless sharpens our perception of the fait accompli of this now
massive fourth power of government by illustrating the variety
and suppleness of its operations and then emphasizing that on
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the whole the administrators are discreetly aware of the omnipresence of judicial review, however limited its scope. When
Justice Breitel finds it impossible to make a categorical definition
of the statutory process, he nevertheless succeeds in clarifying it
by emphasizing the startling range in its methods and in the
quality of its products which, whether works of art or inventions
of the devil, reflect on the whole indifference to judicial review,
however wide its scope.
Likewise one may find it impossible to speak categorically of
the judicial process as felt influence or unseen power or simply
as wilderness crying in a judicial voice. Here too, however, one
can summon illustrations of its infinite variety that yet reflect the
general awareness of the judges that however others hasten forth
they must make their own haste slowly. Their task will become
the more important as it increasingly involves not only decision
on actual cases but decision on the selection of cases for review.
Certainly no rude priority is accorded to common law cases over
those arising out of statutes. Moreover, the distinction between
so-called "private law" and so-called "public law" becomes increasingly blurred in a crowded society that is continually diminishing the boundaries of private lives as it expands the boundaries
of public interest.
It is true, as Justice Breitel has noted, that whole subjects of the
law are still largely unclaimed by legislatures. Although they are
free to make such appropriation, that possibility cannot justify
judicial abdication of present responsibility for their development. A generation ago Mr. Justice Cardozo reflected from experiencc that the judicial process had recurringly to be creative. For
recurringly it happened that a judge failed to find the amiable
ratio decidendi supposedly awaiting discovery among the reeds of
precedent to swaddle a foundling case becomingly and set its cries
at rest. Since he could not let it cry forever, he must needs
swaddle it with some inventive covering suitable for the occasion
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and durable enough to serve the future. Every basic precedent
was thus once made up out of whole cloth woven by a judge.
There is now wide agreement that a judge can and should participate creatively in the development of the common law. Yet
each time he does so, he must reckon with the ancient suspicion
that creativeness is a disturbing excess of skill, at odds with circumspection, darkly menacing the stability of the law. Actually,
the creative decision is circumspect in the extreme, for it reflects
the most careful consideration of all the arguments for a conventional solution and all the circumstances that now render such a
solution so unrealistic as to doom its serviceability for future cases.
Although the judge's predilections may play a part in setting the
initial direction he takes toward the creative solution, there is
little danger of their determining the solution itself, however
much it bears the stamp of his individual workmanship. Our great
creative judges have been men of outstanding skill, adept at discounting their own predilections and careful to discount them
with conscientious severity. The disinterestedness of the creative
decision is further assured by the judge's arduous articulation
of the reasons that compel the formulation of an original solution and by the full disclosure in his opinion of all aspects of the
problem and of the data pertinent to its solution. Thereafter the
opinion must pass muster with scholars and practitioners on the
alert to note any misunderstanding of the problem, any error in
reasoning, any irrelevance in data, any oversight of relevant data,
any premature cartography beyond the problem at hand. Every
opinion is thus subject to approval.
The real concern is not the remote possibility of too many
creative opinions but their continuing scarcity. The growth of the
law, far from being unduly accelerated by judicial boldness, is
unduly hampered by a judicial lethargy that masks itself as judicial dignity with the tacit approval of an equally lethargic bar.
The legal training that should quicken imaginative use of the
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rich grammar of the law in opinions and also in briefs induces a
disquieting number of sanctimonious copies of old forms of speech
that bear little relation to present-day life. We have a plethora of
copycats. Whatever progress we are making, as in rules of civil
procedure, is woefully inadequate to meet the need for a modernized law. Massive anachronisms endure in its substance, their
venerability discouraging judges from voicing the rude possibility
that they may have reached retirement age.
What of the vaunted stability in this enshrinement of precedents? In practice, distinctions of all manner are appended to the
shrine. No one knows what fiction is to be taken straight; no one
can be sure what constitutes the present object of veneration.
Law offices, wise in the ways of our unstable idol worship,
meditate well their emphases and understatements in the presentation of a case and sometimes present it with substantial omissions. A judge learns from experience to be wary of giving full
faith and credit to any presentation, however plausible, however
polished. He must educate himself as best he can to the possibilities that may be lurking in the wings. Even with the advantage
of detachment, however, he cannot hope to ferret them all out,
for they are legion. He too must select, on another plane from
that of the advocates, the issues that appear to him salient and
the data that appear significant. In a morass of uncertainty lie a
variety of precedents, and the judge makes selection upon selection before reaching his decision. It is no ready text to come by
and there is no well-edited chapter to which it can be added. The
precedents are writ in type that moves like water and they are
not holy writ.
For the most part the precedents serve well enough to guide
men in their legal affairs. When they invite litigation, however,
their stability is already in question, perhaps because they have
been rendered ambiguous by conflicting interpretations, or have
grown archaic, or have been challenged at last as they should have
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been earlier for their original nonsense. Why then should we not
welcome their frank renunciation when it is reasonably clear
that there has been no reliance on them" or that they have cast
enough shadows behind them to render any further reliance on
them unjustifiable? Those who plead reliance do not necessarily
practice it. Thus counsel for a client that had sold liability insurance to a state agency pleaded the sovereign immunity doctrine;
on questioning, however, he conceded that the agency had insured itself in awareness of the growing limitations on the doctrine as set forth in a case decided in 1898.
The plea of reliance would perpetuate archaic precedents. We
have not begun to make use as we should of the sensible solution
approved nearly a generation ago in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co." The court simultaneously protected
those who might have relied on such a precedent and gave warning that it would no longer control future cases. One who has
invoked this solution to no avail may be permitted to lament that
it has met with such resistance."
The alternative is to live uneasily with an unfortunate precedent by wearing it thin with distinctions that at last compel a
cavalier pronouncement, heedless of the court's failure to make a
frank overruling, that it must be deemed to have revealed itself as
overruled by its manifest erosion. It must be cold comfort to bewildered counsel to ruminate that the precedent on which he relied was never expressly overruled because it so patently needed
to be.
Tu.E GROWTH OF THE LAw 122 (1924); SCAPR PRECEDENT
(1955).
~Guidi v. State, 41 Cal. 2d 623, 262 P.24 3 (1953).
46287 U.S. 358 (1932).
47Sutter Basin Corp. v. Brown, 40 Cal. 2d 235, 249,
253 P.2d 649, 656 (1953);
Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d 312, 317 (1944); cf. County of Los

<See CAnoozo,
AND Poucy I2-13

Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 680-81, 312 P.2d 680, 685-86 (1957); People v.

Ryan, 152 Cal. 364, 369, 92 Pac. 853, 855 (1907); People v. Maughs, 149 Cal.
253, 263, 86 Pac. 187, 191 (1906).

ROGER

J.

TRAYNOR

55

Still, if all is not at attention in the courts, neither is all at ease.
They have significantly expanded the concept of obligation. They
are recognizing a much-needed right to privacy. They are recognizing a right to recovery for prenatal injuries and intentionally
inflicted mental suffering." They are recognizing the right of one
member of the family to recover against another." They are recognizing liability once precluded by charitable or governmental
immunities. The now general acceptance of the manufacturer's
liability to third persons for negligence has stimulated inquiry
into appropriate bases for possible strict liability for injuries resulting from defective products.;" The courts are moving closer
to open preoccupation with compensation for personal injuries,
which is bound in turn to augment the scope of insurance.
Obviously, however, they cannot undertake the comprehensive
studies, or act upon them, for rational solution of such overwhelming problems as arise from the daily destruction on the
highways. They cannot even begin to cope with the resulting
litigation. There is grave question that adversary presentation and
jury findings reconstruct the circumstances of an injury accurately enough to assess liability justly and to award appropriate
damages." There is such extraordinary inconsistency in the determinations as to cast doubt upon the rationality of expressing
liability in terms of fault. A Columbia University study has
demonstrated that liability turns on many things besides fault,
notably on ability to pay, usually tantamount to insurance, and
on insurance company practices as to settlement. 5 2 In all likeli4 8State

Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.24 282

(1952).
4oEmery v.Emery, 45 Cal. 24 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
5oGordon v. Aztec Brewving Go., 33 Cal. 2d 514, 523, 203 P.2d 522, 528 (1949)
(concurring opinion); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 24 453, 461, 150
P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
5 i5ee Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 635,
640 (1958).
s"COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FoR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
REPORT BY THE COMMiTTEE To STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE AcciDENTS 92 (1932).
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hood the reforms that such studies suggest will sooner or later materialize in legislation, where they most appropriately belong. The
courts will then no longer spend most of their time on the highways; they will be freer to consider the large problems that have
preceded and succeeded the comparatively recent advent of the
automobile.
Prophecy is more difficult in areas such as the criminal law,
whose development has rested with the courts since time immemorial. Had the world always known what we know now,
had the learned judges of other days enjoyed the advantage of
later learning, had more of them been courageous and imaginative as well as merely learned, had customary beliefs not always
constituted a phalanx against new ideas, we might have had a
rational development of criminal law. Instead, its development
has been warped by successive irrationalities that have matched
the potions and bloodletting of medicine. The persistent inadequacy of our senseless hodgepodge of precedents is the more
shocking in comparison with such undertakings as the Model
Penal Code of the American Law Institute now evolving under
the leadership of Professor Wechsler of the Columbia Law
School. One hesitates to plead for reforms in the name of common sense, however, for we belong to a profession that prides
itself on not throwing chaos lightly to the winds.
Nowhere do its excesses of caution persist more tenaciously than
in the law of evidence. Warily it resists the seductive reason of
such proposals as the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform
Rules. It is still possible to say, as Professors Morgan and
Maguire said some twenty years ago, that "there is scarcely a
segment of the subject which does not call for re-examination and
revision."5 3 We can ill afford such passive resistance. Were we
to keep accounts as business must, we would soon realize how
53 Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HAnv. L.

REv. 909, 922 (1937).
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seriously our obsolescent methods impede our productivity and
impair the quality of our products. The legislatures are quite
properly uninterested in undertaking reforms that are so plainly
a responsibility for bench and bar. Unfortunately bench and bar
have shirked that responsibility with assiduous care.
Justice Breitel has noted that the legislature also properly keeps
its distance in those areas of the law whose problems are so complicated and whose development is therefore so unpredictable as
to defy formulation of rules in advance. When, as in conflict of
laws, new cases not only fail to portend future directions but
also fail to respond to the facile theories of the past, the need is
all the greater for judicial imagination in decision bold enough
to reject already unrealistic rules, yet cautious enough not to
make formulations that reach too zealously into the future. More,
it must also be skillful enough to strengthen emphasis not only
on the freedom of the forum in choice of law but also on its
corresponding responsibility for the local law it thus makes. Such
responsibility calls for perception in distinguishing between real
and spurious conflicts at the outset. It precludes a provincial point
of view, for the responsible decision proceeds from reflection as
to which jurisdiction has the dominant interests and a consideration of these interests against others in the light of local policy.
Though the main responsibility for rational development of
conflict of laws rests with the courts, it is for the legislatures to
modernize existing statutes, in such fields as the administration of
decedents' estates, where provincial preoccupation with local
interests makes administration needlessly slow and cumbersome
and costly. Increasingly they must envisage uniform laws where
states are at odds not on basic policy but on such mechanics of
regulation as notice to creditors and creditors' priorities.54
The relatively undeveloped field of conflict of laws serves to
dramatize not only what large creative jobs the courts must under"See People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
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take but also what comprehensive statutory revision falls to legislatures. Such creativeness and such revision is needed in every
field of the law to keep pace with the epochal changes in our once
self-contained little world. The task of the judges will continue to
be the lonely one of detached adjustment of controversies. These
are becoming so complex that we should be concerned less to multiply judges than to minimize sources of controversy. We tend to
think that legislators can minimize controversy if they are so
minded by producing model laws. Justice Breitel rightly reminds
us that they are now so heavily engaged in investigation and lawmaking on so many fronts that we cannot expect them to close
ranks for the single-minded task of making repairs and renewals
in the common law. What they can do is to follow the example of
such states as New York and California and set up law revision
commissions, secure enough to withstand the prevailing winds of
pressure groups, that would make timely use of the abundant wasting assets of scholarly studies in a continuous formulation of statutes that would command respect for their careful drafting without
claiming a sanctity for their printed words that would discourage
periodic reexamination of their fitness for survival.
There are those who would entice us with the proposition
that we can solve our problems by reducing the number of our
laws. Theirs is a siren song to lure us from the arduous labor that
the times call upon us to perform. We cannot revert to a primitive
simplicity in our laws vhen our mode of living becomes ever
more complex. However much a law revision commission can
expedite the liquidation of obsolete or superfluous statutes, it must
be prepared to formulate new and better ones.
The day is fast coming when no state can afford to be without
such a commission. The complexities hastening that day are
bound to hasten also the wholehearted recognition, advocated by
Mr. Justice Stone in 1936, of statutes as sources of law, "starting points for judicial lawmaking comparable to judicial deci-

ROGER J. TRAYNOR

59

cisions."" Sporadic recognition there has been and it is growing,
as Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court recently noted,
citing such illustrations as judicial development of the law based
upon the Married Women's Acts but transcending their literal
terms." Nevertheless courts have not begun to utilize all the
latent energy in statutes to generate new law. Clues to the possibilities appear in the analogies the courts have already made
from statutes. They have long been invoking in negligence cases
the standards of conduct set forth in penal statutes as a test for
civil liability. There is of course great variety of invocation. Thus
in a single case the judges stated their separate views that the
statutory standard for criminal liability was the appropriate one
for civil liability, that violation of the penal statute created a rebuttable presumption of negligence, and finally that such violation was merely evidence of negligence.5 7
However bumbling, such invocation of statutes exemplifies
their kinship with precedents and tolls the weakness of the lingering pedantry that sees them only as alien successors or usurpers. Statutes, like precedents, may be radioactive, their emanations expanding with the times. Such may be the penal statutes
specifying liability with reference to a particular area or class.
Suppose, for example, a penal statute regulates conduct only on
the public highways, in a jurisdiction where all crimes are statutory. The court could not properly extend the area of crime by
applying the statute to conduct on private roads. If the statute
sets forth an appropriate standard of reasonable conduct for all
roads, however, the court should be free to invoke it in a civil
case involving negligence on a private road even though there has
been no criminal violation."8
asStone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Hiuny. L. REv. 4, 12 (1936).
5oSchaefer, PRECEDENT AND POLICY 18-19 (1955).
5TSatterlee

v. Orange Glen School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947).
58Cf. Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943).
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The court should also be free to make broad use of the standards in penal statutes preoccupied with the protection of a particular class. It is literal in the extreme to regard that preoccupation as indicative of indifference to the protection of any
others. Yet the rule persists that a plaintiff cannot base a cause
of action for negligence on the violation of a penal statute
unless he is a member of the class the statute was designed to
protect. Thus one who is not an employee is precluded from invoking a statute designed solely to protect employees even though
he is injured by the very conduct proscribed. It is logic run riot
that a statute requiring the barricading of an open well or elevator shaft for the protection of employees cannot, by virtue of its
particularity, be invoked for the protection of any others.
We have been slow not only in drawing pertinent analogies
from statutes but also in expanding the connotations of their own
terms to keep pace with the incessant inventiveness of our economy. We forget that legislatures are neither omnipresent nor
omniscient. Whatever their alertness to the times, the currency
of their statutes begins to depreciate the moment they are enacted.
Even if they were in perpetual session they could not possibly
enact all the postscripts to yesterday's regulations that the events
of each day would suggest. And if some machine could conceivably be devised to tabulate such postscripts they would be
self-defeating, for their very numbers would defy intelligent application. To say as we did earlier that we are bound to have
more laws is not to advocate that they should roll off a ticker
tape.
If in many fields it is impossible to prophesy forthcoming
events and idle to tabulate actual ones, we must expect our statutory laws to become increasingly pliable to creative judicial elaboration. Nevertheless, in Justice Breitel's apt words, "the legislative
tradition in this country assumes and depends on a dynamic and
modernized common law system of law." In some fields more
than in others the courts have been responsive to this tradition.
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One might note by way of illustration how the California courts
have interpreted an 1872 statute authorizing service of process on
foreign corporations doing business in the state. Since 1872 there
has been great diminution in the protection from suit afforded
foreign corporations by the due process clause. The mutations in
that clause have had their effect on the state court's interpretation
of the phrase "doing business in the state." They have reasoned
that at the time of its adoption it afforded not so much a test for
immunity as a test for jurisdiction, consonant with the tenor then
of the due process clause. The elastic contours of that clause make
it unlikely that any test for jurisdiction geared to its then current
tenor was more than illustrative of service of process in accord
with the jurisdictional concepts of that period. As those concepts
have expanded, the courts have found that the literal wording of
the 1872 test correspondingly expanded in meaning." One could
find other illustrations of the leeway afforded to courts by a changing Constitution for the interpretation of statutes closely tied
thereto.
Many a statute, however, stands outside the radiations of the
flexible Constitution and is contained in terms that have no
radiations of their own into the common law. The task of the
courts is then not creative utilization of the statute as a source or
supplement of the common law but merely a rendition of its
meaning that conforms to the legislative purpose. Yet even here,
as Justice Breitel reminds us, there are large problems of interpretation. Certainly the court is not at liberty to seek hidden meanings not suggested by the statute or the available extrinsic aids.
Speculation cuts brush with the question: what purpose did the
legislature express as it strung its words into a statute?
An insistence upon judicial regard for the words of a statute does not
imply that they are like words in a dictionary to be read with no ranging
of the mind. They are no longer at rest in their alphabetical bins. Released,
combined in phrases that imperfectly communicate the thoughts of one
5 9Henry

R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
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man to another, they challenge men to give them more than passive reading, to consider well their context, to ponder what may be their consequences.co
Judges have found more than once that absolute phrases are
subject to qualifications implicit in the context of the whole
statute. Judge Edgerton has invoked the classic illustration of
the Bologna ordinance against bloodletting in the streets, which
did not make criminals of surgeons." The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted a statute, forbidding encouragement to
aliens to migrate to this country to perform services of any kind,
as not applicable to the employment of a clergyman by a church."
Our own court in California has made a comparable interpretation of a phrase specifically requiring dismissal of an action
not brought to trial within five years." Certain express exceptions
in the statute afforded a basis for implied exceptions in the
seemingly absolute phrase, when the statute was read as a whole
in the light of its legislative purpose "to prevent avoidable delay
for too long a period." Hence, the statute did not compel
dismissal when it was impossible, impracticable, or futile to
bring the action to trial.
There are times when words thus tested prove themselves so
at odds with a clear legislative purpose as to pose a dilemma
for the judge. He knows that there is an irreducible minimum
of error in statutes because they deal with multifarious and
frequently complicated problems. He hesitates to undertake
correction of even the most obvious legislative oversight, knowing
that theoretically the legislature has within its power the correction
of its own lapses. Yet he also knows how cumbersome the legislative process is, how massive the machinery that must be set
coPeople v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1, 5 (1950).
or Ross v.Hartmnan, 139 F.2d 14, 16 (1943).

o'-Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). Compare
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (reliance on literal words) with
Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944) (reaction against such reliance).
03CAI. CODE CIV. PROC. § 583.
4MRose v. Knapp, 38 Cal. 2d 114, 117, 237 P.2d 981, 983 (1951).
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in motion for even the smallest correction, how problematic that
it will be set in motion at all, how confusion then may be
worse confounded.
What a court does is determined in the main by the nature
of the statute. It may be so general in scope as to invite judicial
elaboration. It may evince such careful draftsmanship in the
main as to render its errors egregious enough to be judicially
recognized as such, inconsistent with the legislative purpose.
Thus a revenue act that set forth the basis for determining
uncompensated loss from damage to nonbusiness property failed
to specify that depreciation should enter into the computation.
The taxpayer claimed that since he was not allowed depreciation
under another section he need not compute it in determining
his loss. He therefore claimed a deduction of $1,635 based on
original cost although his actual loss was only $35. In rejecting
his claim the court found that the missing specification was
implied by the apparent legislative purpose in the statute read
as a whole and declared that the reason of the law in such
cases should prevail over its letter."

The experienced draftsmen of tax laws find it impossible to
foresee all the problems that will test the endurance of their
words. They did not foresee the intriguing question whether
the United States is a resident of the United States, which
arose under a revenue act taxing interest received by foreign
corporations from such residents. What to do when a foreign
corporation received interest from the United States? Mr. Justice
Sutherland decided that this country resided in itself. He found
a spirit willing to take up residence though the flesh was weak,
if indeed not entirely missing. The ingenuity of the solution
compels admiration, whatever misgivings it may engender as to
our self-containment.co
v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939); see Travnor, Tax Decisions of The
Supreme Court, 1939 PROCEEDINGS OP THE NATIONAL AssociATIoN 27, 55-57.
o0Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 92 (1934).
05 Helvering
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So the courts now and again prevent erratic omissions or wayward words from defeating legislative purpose, even though they
thereby disregard such conventional canons as the one that tax
statutes are to be strictly construed against the government. We
may well ask why they should not disregard such a canon altogether when it so handily serves the tricks and devices of taxpayers
who would avoid their tax liabilities at the expense of their
fellows." The image persists of a Gargantuan government pitted
against a little taxpayer carrying a burden too big for his frail bones.
Actually, of course, there are millions of taxpayers sharing the
burden of payment for the services they have come to expect of
their government. Whenever one of them is successful at tax avoidance the burden on all the others, most of whom are quite little,
becomes so much the greater. If we accept the legislative purpose
of distributing the tax burden justly, that purpose should prevail
over a pedantic strict construction against the government that in
effect militates against other taxpayers.
We might well look askance at all canons of interpretation that
deflect attention from the legislative purpose. The more courts
intone these ancient saws, the less realistic is their concern apt to
be with the meaning of the statute they are asked to interpret.
They should be particularly on guard against repetitive invocations
in areas such as criminal law, already obscured with archaic classifications of offenses. In California the Penal Code specifically
places the courts on guard with the injunction that "its provisions
are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with
a view to effect its objects and promote justice."68 The courts are
thus encouraged to abandon clich6s in determining the legislative
purpose.
This freedom has enabled them to reflect critically on the recur6TSee
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ring problem of when mens rea is an essential element of a crime
whose statutory definition does not specify it although general
provisions in the Penal Code 0 appear to require it without exception. Our court has resolved this problem in the case of bigamy 0
and the felonious possession of narcotics" by making wrongful
intent an essential element of the crime. We have resolved the
problem in manslaughter" by making criminal negligence an element. Again, to insure its constitutionality, we have read into a
statute compelling the forfeiture of any automobile used to transport narcotics a requirement that the possessor of the automobile
have knowledge of what he is transporting." In contrast, we have
interpreted as primarily regulatory rather than penal, and therefore as requiring no interpolation of mens rca, the so-called "public welfare offenses" carrying light penalties and involving no
moral obloquy. Thus a druggist who innocently sold an adulterated
drug that caused a death was guilty of violating a statute prohibiting such sales; but since his offense lacked the essential mens rea
it was not an "unlawful act" within the definition of involuntary
manslaughter."'
The court's broad use of its authorization to interpret the fair
import of statutory language in the interest of justice had necessarily to be creative in interpreting incompletely coordinated provisions with due consideration for the public interest in both
crime prevention and protection of the innocent. It is important
to add that any court undertaking such interpretation should
articulate with particular care the reasons that led to its choice of
alternatives.
We come upon an intriguing but quite different problem when
we consider what should be the fair import of legislative silence
in the wake of statutory interpretation embodied in the occasional
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precedent that proves increasingly unsound in the solution of
subsequent cases. Barring those exceptional situations where
the entrenched precedent has engendered so much reliance that
its liquidation would do more harm than good, a court should
be free to overrule such a precedent despite legislative inaction.
It is unrealistic to suppose that it [the legislature] can note, much less
deliberate the effect of each judicial construction of statutory provisions, absorbed as it is with forging legislation for an endless number and variety of
problems, under the constant pressure of considerations of urgency and
expediency. The fiction that the failure of the Legislature to repudiate
an erroneous construction amounts to an incorporation of that construction into the statute not only commits the Legislature to embrace something that it may not even be aware of, but bars the court from reexamining its own errors, consequences as unnecessary as they are serious.70
Nonetheless we can rest assured that any backwardness of the
courts is sooner or later noted by the commentators. Judicial
lethargy sometimes enables unworthy decisions to endure longer
than they should, but at least they are in the public stocks and
subject to the critical glance of any passer-by. The commentators
might well begin to emulate such examples as that of the Columbia Law School, whose leadership is noted by Professor Newman,
and train their critical eyes on statutes as they long have on judicial opinions.
Still we can hardly expect that there will ever be widespread
heed to the subdued alarums of scholars. So we come to it that it

is for the bar to participate in far larger measure than ever before
in the rational development of the law by giving consistent and
organized help in the transformation of scholarly projects into
laws. It is not too much to expect of the education that fits lawyers
for private practice that it should also make them generously
responsive to the need for rational laws in the public interest.
Thin re Halcomb, 21 Cal. 2d 126, 132, 130 P.2d 384, 388 (1942)
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177 P.2d 757, 775-76 (1947) (dissenting opinion).

